These are comments from Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In regards to the statement that “Economic recovery assistance should be directed to commercially-oriented actors capable of providing the greatest impact in revitalizing strategic market sectors in the economy.”

How does CERP operate compatibly if it can’t interact with the private sector? The military clearly appreciates that job creation/employment and the private sector is the way to go, but they don’t have a mechanism currently to support that assumption.

These are comments from Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In regards to economic recovery programs targeting stable, equitable, and potentially high growth markets, in southeastern Afghanistan we currently don’t have the luxury.

These are comments made by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In regards to the statement in the paper, “Economic recovery efforts should consider dynamic approaches and multiple interventions along the entire value chain – from input supply to producers to end-markets to external policy makers. Prescribed, uniform approaches at one level, risk creating market distortions due to unbalanced growth.”

This is an excellent point; particularly apparent in water and agriculture. We don’t look at the watershed, and we don’t look at the entire value chain when it comes to agriculture. We can have inputs at various points along the chain; for example, quality seed through ICARDA, village seed storage support, improved milling capacity, better post-harvest storage, and flour fortification initiatives.

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In response to the statement that “investments in a network of small agro-input suppliers may contribute more to economic recovery through job creation and increased accessibility of seeds and other inputs for a large number of small-holder farmers than targeting assistance to a larger, state-owned competitor.”

I think that the programming by the VEGA Alliance’s consortium is an excellent example of a US PVO working within the current non-permissive environment in close collaboration with the military.

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

There is no formal “regulatory environment” to speak of currently. Statements like these seem to put into question the real-world relevancy of these Sphere guidelines. I didn’t see the word “corruption” used once in the material that I have just read. I may have missed it, but….

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

Regarding Common Standard 4 and the example box where it states “Similarly, helping to create a competitive veterinary sector may have stronger impacts on raising the impacts of pastoralist households than assisting the families directly.”

I think that the AVA’s Veterinary Field Units private sector program might be a classic example.

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In reference to the example that states “Households engaged in agriculture may not be able to profit from improved seed and fertilizer unless there are first improvements in infrastructure or increased processing capacity among the agro processors that they sell to.”

I think this is an excellent point and one which again goes back to my single most important takeaway from reading this material—the need to emphasize the full value chain and interventions all along the chain.

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In reference to the example that states “For a program looking to increase commercial skills training for youth, it is generally better to build upon existing and/or traditional means of transferring knowledge—for example, using formal institutions such as schools and apprenticeships, rather than developing a new training center.”

I think this is another classic example of the fact that if there were NGOs working in this province they would find the military absolutely in lock-step with this suggestion and they would find an active and willing donor.

These are comments by Rick Carbone, from USAID Afghanistan:

In regards to the Common Standard 5 example, “A financial services institution offering loans should set interest rates at the onset to ensure long term operational and financial viability of the institution.”

The only bank institution is the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). DAB is actually the central bank and Gardez as the capital of Paktya Province is lucky to have one of the regional DAB banks present here. But, it has divested itself of much of the commercial accounts that it had been pressured by events to accept. No one has stepped into this void yet.